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Catholic leaders to give us the married as well as the celibate diocesan
priests we need.
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.

GERMAN IDEALISM: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUBJECTIVISM, 1781–1801. By
Frederick C. Beiser. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2002. Pp. xvi + 726.
$61.50.
Beiser’s important earlier studies—The Fate of Reason (1987) and Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (1992)—placed the trajectory of
ideas, issues, and arguments of late 18th- and early 19th-century German
philosophy and political thought within an illuminating account of their
cultural and political contexts. In this work, B. shifts attention from that
larger background and presents, in contrast, a closely focused analysis of
the texts of six thinkers—Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, and
Schelling—that bear upon “one specific theme: the meaning of idealism
itself, and more specifically the reaction against subjectivism” (viii). The
analysis is in service of a larger thesis that goes counter to a commonly
accepted interpretation of German idealism as “essentially the culmination
of the Cartesian tradition,” which is usually accompanied by “a seductively
simple narrative” that makes it “the gradual and inevitable completion of
Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ ” (1–2). B. argues instead that it is “more
accurate to say the exact opposite: that the development of German idealism is not the culmination but the nemesis of the Cartesian tradition” (3).
He sees Kant marshaling against the truly subjectivist Cartesian “way of
ideas” arguments that have within them the structural and normative elements that later provide the framework upon which his successors constructed their objective idealisms. On B.’s reading the trajectory of idealism
thus moves from “the ‘subjective’ or ‘formal’ idealism of Kant and Fichte,
according to which the transcendental subject is the source of the form but
not the matter of experience” to an “ ‘objective’ or ‘absolute’ idealism . . . according to which the forms of experience are self-subsistent and
transcend both the subject and object” (11).
For B., a variety of factors contribute to the subjectivist interpretation he
seeks to counter. Among the most important has been “a failure [on the
part of the subjectivist interpretation] to distinguish between two very
different versions or forms of idealism” (6). In the first version, the ideal is
indeed the subjective and stands as the mental or spiritual over against the
physical or the material; in the second, it is objective and stands as the
archetypal or normative over against the ectypical or the substantive. He
notes that the idealists are not entirely blameless for such a misreading
since they often did not themselves carefully distinguish these two forms. In
consequence, an important part of B.’s corrective strategy is to untangle
the interplay of these two forms within the texts he examines; this done, he
argues that, when properly read, the line of development is “a progressive
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desubjectivization of the Kantian legacy” (6) culminating in the objective
idealism most notably articulated in Schelling’s writings from 1799 to 1801.
B. also considers Hegel’s history of philosophy—in which all is prelude
to Hegel’s own system of absolute idealism—to be an important source of
the subjectivist interpretation of idealism. In addition, a key emendation
that B. sees Hegel’s account needing is the retrieval of the roles that
Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel each played in the development of idealism, summed up in the claim that “there is not a single Hegelian theme that
cannot be traced back to his predecessors in Jena” and “the fathers of
absolute idealism were Hölderlin, Schlegel and Schelling” (10). His treatment of these figures in the last 250 pages does not, however, attempt to
confirm that claim by a systematic comparison of their texts with Hegel’s.
B.’s method throughout is to analyze issues so as to recover how they
presented themselves to each of these thinkers and to reconstruct arguments so as to recapture the intelligibility they had for their authors—even
in those cases where B. finds the arguments unsuccessful.
This work of philosophical and historical scholarship will be an especially
valuable resource for those who need to understand and assess the impact
of German idealism on theology. Though such concerns are beyond the
careful philosophical focus of B.’s study, his analyses are very useful for
gaining a much better sense of the positions and arguments that Kant and
these five successors set forth in their texts. B. provides a useful baseline
for measuring the extent to which subsequent theological engagement with
these thinkers—whether by appropriation or opposition—has itself adequately grasped the philosophical point of their positions. The introductions that B. provides to each of the four main sections of the book provide
a concise overview of the main theses he will advance in consequence of his
detailed analyses; they offer a useful road map for readers who may not
need to journey along every argumentative track that B. traces.
Marquette University, Milwaukee

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.

DINAMISMO INTELLETTUALE DAVANTI AL MISTERO:
SOPRANNATURALE NEL PERCORSO SPECULATIVO DI

LA QUESTIONE DEL
J. MARÉCHAL. By
Daniele Moretto. Dissertatio Series Romana, vol. 33. Pontificio Seminario
Lombardo in Roma. Milan: Edizioni Glossa, 2001. Pp. xx + 399. €23.24.
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In his highly significant 1951 study probing the essence of Karl Barth’s
theology, Hans Urs von Balthasar wielded a double-edged sword, hoping
to present a systematic alternative to the conceptualist rationalism of neoScholasticism and to the overweening supernaturalism of Barth’s occasionalism. To this end, Balthasar adduces throughout his book the philosophy
of Joseph Maréchal, who had speculatively adumbrated what Henri de
Lubac had historically demonstrated, namely, that the natural order exists
only as inscribed within the unicus ordo supernaturalis. At least at this
point in his career, Balthasar, along with the other nouveaux théologiens
recently clustered at Lyon-Fourvière, found Maréchal to be a breath of

